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Several standard components of managerial compensation contracts have been criticized for
encouraging managers to manipulate short-term information about the ﬁrm, thereby reducing
transparency. This includes bonus schemes that encourage earnings smoothing, and option
packages that allow managers to cash out early when the ﬁrm is overvalued. We show in an
optimal contracting framework that these components are critical for giving long-term incentives
to managers. The lack of transparency induced by the features of the contract makes it harder
for the principal to engage in ex post optimal but ex ante ineﬃcient liquidity provision to the
manager.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
How can eﬀective executive compensation be set up when managers can manipulate short-term
information? Although a long-standing question in corporate governance, public attention to this
issue reached new heights at the beginning of the millennium after governance scandals at, for
example, Enron and WorldCom. A common thread in these scandals was accounting manipulations
to increase stock-prices. In a number of cases, allegations have been made that managers proﬁted
from short-term increases by their substantial stock compensation packages that had relatively
short-term maturity and so were easy to unwind before the manipulation became apparent.1
There is also more systematic evidence that managers utilize and hide information to increase
their compensation at the expense of shareholders. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) examine 1200
public companies from 1992-2001 and show that large stock option exercises by top executives are
followed by abnormally low stock returns. Furthermore, in the period preceding exercise, discre-
tionary earnings are abnormally high, and fall to abnormally low levels after exercise, suggesting
that managers opportunistically pump up the stock price by managing earnings prior to exercise.
In the wake of the scandals, a number of economists have drawn at least two conclusions about
how corporate governance must be improved: Companies should make it harder for executives
to unwind stocks and options, and transparency should be increased to make manipulation more
diﬃcult.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2002 contains provisions mainly to thwart manipulation by
increasing transparency, but also to make insider trading and early cashing out harder.3
1For example, Enron used at least two questionable ways to inﬂate earnings. First, they booked the net present
value of future income from contracts as earnings in a given year, giving them substantial freedom in assumptions
about future cash ﬂows and discount rates. Second, they set up aﬃliates called “Special Purpose Entities” to remove
debt from their balance sheet (see, for example, Healy and Palepu (2003)).
Oﬃcers at Enron engaged in heavy selling before revealing third quarter loss of $638M on October 17, 2001.
Amalgamated Bank contended in a lawsuit that Enron oﬃcers and directors made misleading statements about the
company and sold about $1 billion worth of stock in the three years leading up to the time the scandals broke. (N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 2001). Furthermore, In the year before the bankruptcy, top executives withdrew a combined $32
million from their deferred compensation accounts, even though there was a 10% penalty for doing so. (WSJ, Nov.
10, 2002). (We thank David Yermack for pointing this article out to us.)
2See, for example, Holmström and Kaplan (2003), Jensen and Murphy (2004), Bebchuk and Fried (2004), and
Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005).
Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) show that managers have an incentive to increase earnings to inﬂate short-
term stock prices, and that in fact an optimal contract may encourage this, when irrational overconﬁdent investors
get fooled. They conclude that longer vesting periods may be socially desirable, but not necessarily for current
shareholders.
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state that the early vesting of options is one of the problems of corporate governance.
They argue that CEOs should be limited from selling stocks once the option has been exercised: “...ﬁrms have given
executives broad freedom to unload options and shares, a practice that has been beneﬁcial to executives but costly
to shareholders”.
3Examples of restrictions that make unwinding harder include Section 305, which states that oﬃcers must reim-
burse the ﬁrm for any bonuses or gains on stock- or option-sales gained during a year for which accounting was later
2These commonsensical prescriptions are in accordance with standard agency theory. The “in-
formativeness principle” (coined by Holmström (1979)) states that managers’ pay should be tied to
a measure that is as informative as possible about managerial eﬀort. Then, if long-term measures
of performance are harder to manipulate and are more informative, the manager’s pay should be
long-term. Also, it should be beneﬁcial to make signals as informative as possible by making ma-
nipulation harder, or by increasing transparency in other ways. This is also the natural conclusion
that can be drawn from the signal-jamming model of Stein (1989), who shows that managers will
spend costly eﬀort to distort short-term signals when they are compensated on the short-term stock
price, even when the market is not fooled by the distortions.
In this paper we argue that this reasoning is incomplete and sometimes wrong when ex post
Pareto-improving renegotiation cannot be ruled out. We show that there is an inherent conﬂict
between increasing transparency and increasing the maturity of compensation. Indeed, increasing
transparency by, for example, making manipulation harder can make the ﬁrm strictly worse oﬀ
because of the negative eﬀects on long-term incentives.
Our basic argument is that when managers have some preference for early consumption, it is
hard to commit to long-term contracts even when they are ex ante optimal. After a manager has
put down the eﬀort induced by a long-term contract, the contract no longer serves any incentive
purpose. Because the manager is impatient, it is therefore in the interest of both the principal
and the manager to accelerate payments. We show that if short-term signals are observed by both
the manager and the principal (the case of no manipulation), there is nothing preventing such
renegotiation, so contracts must be short-term.
Now suppose the manager can manipulate the short-term signal, making it even less informative
to the principal. This has the disadvantage of making it even harder to incentivize the manager
with short-term contracts. The advantage is that it may now be possible to commit to long-term
contracts. The reason is that manipulation introduces a lemons problem at the renegotiation stage
that reduces the scope for trade. To induce optimistic managers to take an early payment, the
principal must make the payment big. But this means that pessimistic managers will gain at the
expense of the principal, so he may be better oﬀ not renegotiating. If the short-term signal is not
found to be non-compliant, and Section 403, which requires directors and oﬃcers to disclose trading in company stock
within two days.
Examples of measures designed to increase transparency include increased requirements on ﬁnancial accounting,
independence of auditors, and requirements on ﬁnancial sophistication of directors.
3very informative and the manager is not too impatient, a long-term contract with manipulation
will dominate a short-term contract with full transparency.
The optimal contracts we derive are consistent with several observed features of compensation
packages that are remarkably consistent over time and across ﬁrms, but that are hard to explain
with existing theories.
For example, although most executive stock options tend to have expiration times of around 10
years from the grant date, they all have vesting schedules that allow managers to start exercising
options often as soon as one year after the grant date.4 This seems puzzling from the perspective
of the informativeness principle. Not only does it make the contract relatively short-term, but the
maturity of compensation is decided by the manager himself, after he has observed his own private
information about how the ﬁrm is doing. This gives managers an incentive to increase short-term
earnings and cash out early when they know the stock is overvalued, thereby reducing the link
between pay and performance.
We show that such vesting clauses are always part of an optimal long-term contract. The reason
it that, although asymmetric information at the renegotiation stage can make it credible for the
principal not to pay all managers early, it is impossible to prevent him from giving an oﬀer of a
low early payment that only the most pessimistic managers will accept. From this perspective,
early vesting by managers who have inﬂated the stock price is an unfortunate but unavoidable
consequence of lack of commitment, but the alternative where manipulation is ruled out would be
no long-term incentives at all.
Another example is standard bonus packages that are contingent on some accounting measure
such as earnings. These still constitute a large fraction of compensation in most companies, and
arguably create even larger incentives to destroy information than executive stock options. As
documented by Murphy (1999), the size of the yearly bonus is typically zero below a lower target
threshold of the performance measure and caps out at a higher threshold.5 This gives incentives
to exaggerate earnings if the lower threshold is not expected to be met, and decrease earnings (for
example by shifting the reporting of sales to next year) if the earnings are expected to be above
4A typical plan would allow one quarter of the options to be exercised after one year, and an extra quarter in
each of the following three years (see Kole (1997)). Kole (1997), examining the 1980 S&P 500 ﬁrms, calculates that
the average time before any options are allowed to be exercised is 13.5 months, and that the average option can be
exercised after 23.6 months.
5Long term incentive plans based on accounting measures over several years have the same structure (see Murphy
(1999)).
4the higher threshold to make it easier to meet next years bonus.6 Thus, earnings will appear to be
relatively smooth and contain little information on which to base rewards for the manager.
We show that these thresholds can be used in an optimal contract to induce the “right” amount
of transparency. Our argument builds on the assumption that it is easier to hide good information,
by for example pushing sales into the next period, than to fabricate good information when there is
none. By setting a cap on the bonus at a certain threshold of the performance measure, managers
are encouraged to smooth earnings. The lower the threshold is, or the less high-powered the short-
term pay-for-performance is, the easier it is to hit the target earnings, and the less transparent the
ﬁrm will be. The optimal contract will set the bonus region to trade oﬀ the commitment advantage
of lower transparency with the better incentive eﬀects of higher pay-for-performance.
Our analysis casts some doubts on the merits of legislation geared at forcefully increasing
transparency or in other ways restricting contracting opportunities in ﬁrms. If ﬁrms can inﬂuence
transparency by structuring contracts in the right way, ruling out manipulation might have the
unintended consequence of eliminating beneﬁcial long-term contracts. Although it is hard to claim
that Enron and WorldCom had good corporate governance, it may be even more of a stretch to
argue that all companies are run by self-serving or incompetent boards of directors. Yet virtually
all ﬁrms use the type of contracts described above, even when they create more manipulation and
less transparency than contracts that standard agency theory would prescribe.
1.1 Related Literature
Our work builds on the literature on renegotiation proof contracts developed in Dewatripont (1989),
Hart and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). Dewatripont (1989) shows in the context
of a labor model that in a renegotiation proof optimal contract, information is resolved slowly
through time relative to a full commitment level. Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) have a moral
hazard model closer to ours with a risk neutral principal and a risk-averse manager. Although they
do not study optimal contracts under manipulation and do not explicitly focus on transparency,
they show that asymmetric information is essential to provide incentives in a renegotiation proof
contracts. The asymmetric information in their model arises through managers choosing a mixed
strategy in their eﬀort provision, and the optimal contract has option-like characteristics just as
6See Healy (1985), Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995), and Gaver, Gaver, and Austin (1995) for empirical
evidence that bonus packages induce this type of manipulation.
5ours.7
More directly concerned with the optimal level of transparency is Cremer (1995), who shows
in a symmetric information environment that less but common information at an ex post stage
may help a principal commit not to renegotiate. We show that asymmetric information can curtail
renegotiation and hence create a commitment mechanism.
Our paper is also related to the literature on soft budget constraints, where a similar conﬂict
between ex post and ex ante eﬃciency appears. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show that a
lender without deep pockets can commit not to bail out failing ﬁrms and hence create better ex
ante incentives for eﬀort. In our setting, where the lender does have deep pockets, asymmetric
information is the vehicle for preventing renegotiation.
Myers and Rajan (1998) suggest that if assets are too liquid, it is easy for a manager to steal
them. However, they do not study the impact of liquidity on ex ante incentives. They also take an
incomplete contracts approach where liquidity is exogenously speciﬁed, whereas we use a mechanism
design approach.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we lay out the model. In Section 3, as
ab e n c h m a r k ,w es t u d yt h ec a s ew h e r et h eﬁr mc a nc o m m i te xa n t et oac o n t r a c t ,a n dv e r i f yt h e
conclusions from the informativeness principle. In Section 4 we study renegotiation-proof contracts.
Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
A ﬁrm has a project which costs a dollar to ﬁnance. The manager does not have funds to ﬁnance
the project and must look to outsiders for the necessary capital.
The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1. There are three periods, 0,1, and 2. A contract
between an investor and the manager is set up at period 0. Between period 0 and 1, the manager
exerts unobservable eﬀort e ∈ {W, S}. Proﬁt is realized in period 2. Working (e = W) leads to
proﬁt y = R with probability p and proﬁt y =0with probability 1 − p; shirking leads to proﬁt 0
with certainty. Working has a private cost d to the manager. Therefore, the expected gross proﬁt
7In our model, contracts that induce asymmetric information through manipulation typically dominate contracts
that induce it through mixed strategy equilibria, since mixing creates ineﬃciently low eﬀort. We discuss mixing
further in Section 4.2.1 and in the appendix.
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Figure 1: Timeline for the model.
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The manager privately observes an early proﬁt forecast σ ∈ {L,H} in period 1. Conditional on








A high signal H is more likely if future proﬁts are high. A manager with an H (resp. L)s i g n a li s
optimistic (resp. pessimistic). Since proﬁts are informative about eﬀort, and period 1 signals are
informative about proﬁts, the signal in period 1 is also informative about eﬀort but less so than
proﬁts.8
While the manager observes the early proﬁt forecast, he can engage in manipulation to distort
the signal of earnings received by investors. However, manipulation has no eﬀect on the long-term
proﬁt signal. We view manipulation as a way to temporarily mislead investors, but eventually the
true state of the company will be revealed. This captures salient features of the ﬁnancial scandals
8To see that σ is a weaker signal about eﬀort than proﬁts, note that
P(H|W)=pθ +( 1− p)(1− θ) <P(R|W)=p
and
P(H|S)=1− θ>P(0|W)=0
Therefore, even though a high period 1 signal is more likely when the manager works, it is noisier than proﬁts and
c a nh a p p e ne v e ni fs h es h i r k s .
7at Enron and WorldCom where managers succeeded in hiding information in the short-term but
the ﬁrms’ fundamentals became clear eventually.
The public signal of earnings observed by investors in period 1 is a continuous variable φ ∈ [l,h].
If the manager does not manipulate, the signal the investor receives fully reveals the manager’s
proﬁtf o r e c a s t :φ = l if σ = L and φ = h if σ = H. However, a high earnings signal h can be freely
manipulated downward to any φ<h ,while a low earnings signal l can be manipulated upward
with some probability. We view this asymmetry between understating and overstating earnings
as realistic. For example, it may not be very diﬃcult to omit or postpone the reporting of some
orders to lower an initial high earnings signal, but it is probably harder to fabricate false orders
without detection. Denote the likelihood that pessimistic managers can state earnings φ by m(φ).
We assume m(φ) is decreasing, so that it is less likely that a pessimistic manager is able to produce
a bigger overstatement. If the manipulation fails, the pessimistic manager reports earnings l.
The investor gets the proﬁt, in return for ﬁnancing the project and transferring t1 and t2 to
the manager in period 1 and 2. The manager has limited liability, so the transfers have to be non-
negative. The contract is set up to give the manager the incentive to work, and can be contingent
on two variables: The earnings statement φ and the ﬁnal proﬁt. The manager’s strategy is a
choice of whether to work or shirk, and a choice of earnings manipulation contingent on his early
proﬁt forecast. We denote the earnings report of an optimistic manager by φ∗ and of a pessimistic
manager who successfully manipulates by φL.
The investor is risk-neutral and indiﬀerent between consumption and hence transfers at period
1a n d2 :
uI(c1,c 2)=c1 + c2
where cT is consumption at period T ∈ {1,2}. The manager on the other hand always prefers to
be paid at period 1 rather than period 2:
uM(c1,c 2)=c1 + λc2 where 0 ≤ λ<1.
For a similar assumption on managerial impatience, see for example Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole
(2000) or Holmström and Tirole (1997). The discount parameter λ can be interpreted as the cost
of having managerial wealth tied up in long-term compensation, rather than being able to smooth
income perfectly intertemporally. Alternatively, it can represent an opportunity cost of capital for
8the manager, for example if the manager comes up with new ideas as a result of running the current
project. These projects also require seed money and inside money is easier and quicker to utilize
than outside money.9
We assume that pR−1−d>0, so that the ﬁr s tb e s ti st oﬁnance the project, implement high
eﬀort and pay the manager in period 1. Given that contracts cannot be written directly on eﬀort,
the ﬁrst best may not be achievable. The contract must trade oﬀ the better incentive eﬀects from
paying the manager based on the strong proﬁt signal against the loss from paying the manager late.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: First, as a benchmark, we describe optimal
contracts in the case of full commitment. Then, we add a renegotiation stage in period 1.
3F u l l c o m m i t m e n t
A contract {t1(φ),t 2(y,φ)}φ,y is a payment t1 (φ) to the manager in period 1 as a function of
earnings, and a payment t2 (y,φ) in period 2 as a function of the period 2 proﬁta n de a r n i n g s .W e
solve for contracts that maximize the manager’s payoﬀ and give him the incentive to work, subject
to the break-even constraint of the investor and the limited liability constraint for the manager.
Any contract that gives the manager the incentive to work while satisfying the limited liability and
break-even constraints is feasible. If it also maximizes the manager’s payoﬀ,i ti soptimal.
Many properties of the optimal contract follow from the informativeness principle. First, as
period 1 earnings is a more garbled signal of eﬀort than period 2 proﬁt, it is optimal to make
period 2 payments dependent on period 2 proﬁt alone. Second, as zero output in period 2 is more
likely when the manager shirks, it is optimal to set payments to zero in this case. Third, to make
the earnings report as informative as possible, it is optimal never to pay for anything other than the
highest signal h. A high early earnings report is the hardest signal to create when the manager has
shirked and hence paying for this report alone maximizes his incentive to work. These observations
are collected in the following Lemma which is proved in the Appendix:
Lemma 1 An optimal solution can be implemented by setting a payment schedule t1(h) ≥ 0 and
t2 (R,·) ≡ t2 (R) ≥ 0 with all other payments zero.
These conclusions are in line with the prescriptions suggested by policymakers and academics
9We conjecture that our results would be qualitatively unchanged if we instead assumed that investors and man-
agers discount at the same rate but managers are risk averse, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1989). However, the
analysis would be much less tractable and make for a more cluttered exposition.
9alike: Requiring that early payments be made for high earnings reports maximizes transparency as
it is diﬃcult to falsify such reports.
The Lemma allows us to state the full program as
max
t1(h),t2(R)
P (h|W)t1(h)+λP (R|W)t2(R) (P1)
subject to the moral hazard constraint:
P (h|W)t1(h)+λP (R|W)t2(R) − d ≥ P (h|S)t1(h),
the break even constraint:
P (h|W)t1(h)+P (R|W)t2(R) ≤ pR − 1,
and limited liability:
t1(h),t 2(R) ≥ 0,
where
P (h|e)=P (H|e)+m(h)P (L|e)
Note that the break even constraint must always bind at the optimum, since otherwise increasing
either t1(h) or t2(R) will increase the maximand while relaxing the moral hazard constraint.
We ﬁrst ﬁnd the lowest expected cost to the investor to make the manager work. To make the
manager work with a short-term contract with t1(h) > 0 and t2(R)=0 , the lowest cost to the











If such a short-term contract is feasible, it maximizes social surplus as it pays the manager only in
period 1. Hence, a short-term contract is optimal if cost(short,h) ≤ pR − 1.
To make the manager work with a long-term contract with t1(h)=0and t2(R) > 0,t h el o w e s t






10Note that cost(short,h) and cost(long) are both higher than the manager’s private cost d of working.
Inducing the manager to work with a short-term contract is costly because, if the manager shirks,
he still gets a positive payoﬀ if the short-term signal is high. Therefore, he has to be paid an
eﬃciency wage to give him the incentive to work. The long-term contract is costly because it pays
in period 2, when the manager values consumption less. We are especially interested in the case
where long-term pay is cheaper to the investor, so we assume:




In this case cost(long) ≤ cost(short,h). Hence, if a long-term contract is infeasible (i.e. cost(long)
>p R− 1), so is a short-term contract and it is impossible to give the manager the incentive to
work.
Finally, suppose a long-term contract is feasible but a short-term contract is not (i.e. cost(short,h)
>p R− 1 > cost(long)). Since the social surplus is higher when the manager can be made to work
with a short-term contract, the moral hazard constraint is binding at the optimal contract in this
case. Otherwise, it is possible to reduce the second period payment, increase the ﬁrst period pay-
ment, and increase the manager’s payoﬀ without violating the moral hazard constraint. Hence, in
this case, both ﬁrst and second period payments are positive.10 The following proposition collects
our results and gives the solution to the problem under full commitment:
Proposition 1 If a short-term contract is feasible, then at the optimal contract t1(h) > 0 and all
other payments are zero. If a long-term contract is not feasible, then it is impossible to implement
full eﬀort. If a long-term contract is feasible but a short-term contract is not, then at the optimal
contract t1 (h) > 0, t2 (R) > 0 and all other payments are zero.
10Solving for P(h|W)t1(h) from the moral hazard constraint, we have
P(h|W)t1(h)=








(pR − 1) − cost(long)
cost(short,h) − cost(long)
and solving for P(R|W)t2(R) from the break even constraint we have
P(R|W)t2(R)=pR − 1 − P(h|W)t1(h)
= cost(long)
cost(short,h) − (pR − 1)
cost(short,h) − cost(long)
.
11Two characteristics of full commitment contracts are worth pointing out.
First, the optimal contract only depends on the manipulated signal φ and the proﬁt y.T h i s
rules out menus of payments where the manager self-selects into a payment schedule after observ-
ing his private information σ. The vesting schedules used for executive stock options, where the
manager has the right to exercise his options early, is an example of such a menu. However, with
full commitment, there is never any gain from allowing the manager to choose the maturity of
compensation ex post.
Second, the contracts are always high-powered, that is, the remuneration is always increasing in
the realization of the signal φ. This is what encourages the manager to maximally inﬂate earnings.
A less high-powered contract which induces managers to smooth earnings by understating when
they get a high signal and overstating when they get a low signal is never optimal, since it reduces
incentives to work.
We now show how these conclusions change when we insist that the contract should be renego-
tiation proof.
4 Renegotiation Proof Contracts
Suppose now, at time t =1 , after the public signal φ is observed, the investor can propose a new
contract which will be accepted if the manager is at least as well oﬀ as under the old contract.11
As we will see that menus now turn out to be useful, we have to introduce some new notation.
As we show in the appendix, it is enough to look at contracts that pay oﬀ only if the earnings target
φ∗ is reached. A contract is deﬁned as a menu of payments that the manager can choose from by
sending a report r ∈ {L,H} after the target has been reached, and after the renegotiation stage is
over. Let t1(φ∗,r) and t2(y,φ∗,r) be period 1 and period 2 payments for report r ∈ {L,H} and
output y ∈ {0,R}. Then, a contract is t = {t1(φ∗,r),t 2(y,φ∗,r)}y∈{0,R},r∈{L,H} . A renegotiation-
proof contract is now deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The contract t = {t1(φ∗,r),t 2(y,φ∗,r)}y∈{0,R},r∈{L,H} is renegotiation proof for high
11If the manager oﬀers the new contract, there is a signaling problem as he knows his eﬀort and is perhaps the
only player to observe the period 1 signal. Therefore, there are more equilibria in the renegotiation game. However,
the analysis of Maskin and Tirole (1992) suggests that if equilibria must be “strongly renegotiation-proof,” it does
not matter which player makes the renegotiation oﬀer.































≥ t1(φ∗,σ)+λE (t2(y,φ∗,σ)|σ,W) ∀σ (IR)
t0
1(φ∗,r),t 0
2(y,φ∗,r) ≥ 0 ∀r,y (LL)
The incentive compatibility condition (IC) ensures that managers self-select into the right con-
tract on the menu. By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict attention to contracts such that
it is incentive compatible for the manager to reveal his true signal σ in his report. The individual
rationality constraint (IR) ensures that the manager is no worse oﬀ under the new contract t0 than
under the old contract t. Finally, (LL) is the limited liability constraint of the manager. If the
old contract solves this program, it means that there is no way to make both the manager and the
investor better oﬀ with a new contract.
We now solve for renegotiation-proof contracts. Note that no short-term payment can be
renegotiated into a long-term payment, since this lowers the social surplus ex post and thus must
make someone worse oﬀ. The issue is whether long-term payments can be made renegotiation-
proof. We ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ta n yl o n g - t e r mc o n t r a c tm u s th a v eavesting clause such that the manager
can cash out early, and does so if he is pessimistic. We then show that such a contract can be
renegotiation proof if the investor faces suﬃcient adverse selection in the renegotiation game, in
the sense that the probability of dealing with a pessimistic manager is high.
Suppose the earnings target φ∗ is realized. Suppose that the initial contract is not a menu but
speciﬁes a single long-term payment t2(R,φ∗,L)=t2(R,φ∗,H) ≡ t2(R,φ∗) if the proﬁti sh i g h ,
and no short-term payment. But then, the investor is better oﬀ by proposing a new contract t0 (φ∗)









This is a vesting contract with an option to cash out early. Note that this contract is incentive
compatible, since the pessimistic manager is indiﬀerent between the early and late payment, while
the optimistic manager values the late payment more: λt2(R,φ∗)P (R|H,W) >λ t 2(R,φ∗)P (R|L,W).
Managers are as well oﬀ as under the original contract, while the investor is better oﬀ since he saves
on the long-term payment to the pessimistic manager, so the original contract is renegotiated. In
fact, no contract that speciﬁes a long-term payment to a pessimistic manager is renegotiation-proof.
Now we show that the vesting contract above can be renegotiation-proof. Suppose the investor
proposes yet another contract t00 (φ∗) to reduce t0
2(R,φ∗,H) and increase t0
1(φ∗,H) so that an











But now the short-term payment t00
1(φ∗,H) to optimistic managers is higher than the originally
promised short-term payment t0
1(φ∗,L) to pessimistic managers, so pessimistic managers will have
an incentive to deviate and claim they have a high signal. Therefore, the investor will have to pay
the pessimistic managers more than under the vesting contract. If this loss is high enough to eat
up the gains from trade with the optimistic manager, the contract is renegotiation proof.
The intuition is equivalent to the classic lemon’s problem analyzed by Akerlof (1970). Although
there are gains from trade when the manager “sells” his long-term compensation for short-term
compensation, pessimistic managers are more eager to sell, since they know that the long-term
payment is a lemon. Therefore, the market for optimistic managers breaks down.
The following claim shows that any renegotiation-proof contract must consist of a mix between
14such a vesting contract and a short-term bonus.
Claim 1 Any long-term contract that pays when y = R has to be in the form of a vesting contract
{t1 (φ∗,L),t 2 (φ∗,R,H)} where
t1 (φ∗,L)=λP (R|L)t2 (φ∗,R,H)












Proof. In Appendix B.
The renegotiation-proofness condition (2) states that the adverse selection problem has to be
suﬃciently big to overcome the gains from trade. It is easier to provide long-term incentives if
the manager is patient (λ high) so that the gains from accelerating payments is smaller. Also, it
is easier the lower the earnings target is (higher m(φ∗)), since this implies that more pessimistic
managers can reach the target so that the adverse selection is bigger. Finally, the expression in
brackets is a measure of the diﬀerence in expectation about the long-term pay between optimistic
and pessimistic managers: If managers receiving a low signal in period 1 has the same expectation
about high proﬁts in period 2, it is impossible to separate managers, and the contract will be
renegotiated.
One way to implement the vesting contract is to award the manager stock options if the earnings
hurdle φ∗ is met. Suppose there is one stock which is entitled to the gross proﬁto ft h ec o m p a n y ,
and the manager gets an option on a fraction k of this stock at exercise price X per stock. The
stock price St is given by
S1 (φ∗)=E (y|φ∗)=P (R|φ∗)R
S2 (R)=R,S2 (0) = 0
To replicate the long-term pay oﬀ of optimistic managers, we should set k and X so that
k(S2 (R) − X)=t2
15, and to replicate the short-term pay oﬀ of pessimistic managers we should set
k(S1 (φ∗) − X,0) = λP (R|L)t2
which gives
X = R
P (R|φ∗) − λP (R|L)








There are other ways that ﬁrms set up this type of self-selection packages. Awarding stocks
instead of options that also vest over time is one way, although it can be shown that a pure stock
award cannot implement the optimal contract in our setting. Another common way is through
deferred compensation plans, where managers are allowed to forego their current pay or bonus for
future payments.
4.1 Optimal contracts
We now derive the optimal contracts under renegotiation. If a pure short-term contract can make
the manager work, it implements the ﬁrst best and so is optimal. The earnings target will then be
s e ta sh i g ha sp o s s i b l ea tφ∗ = h. The contract is acceptable to the investor if
cost(short, h) ≤ pR − 1
Otherwise, a vesting contract will also have to be used. In this case, the earnings target has to be
set low enough to satisfy the renegotiation-proofness condition (2). The lowest cost to the investor
for making the manager work with a pure vesting contract can be calculated from the moral hazard
constraint:
P (L|W)m(φ∗)t1 (φ∗,L)+λP (H|W)P (R|H,W)t2 (φ∗,R,H) − d
≥ (P (L|S)m(φ∗)+P (H|S))λt1 (φ∗,L)
The left hand side is the expected pay-oﬀ from working. The ﬁrst term is the case where a manager
who works gets a low signal, but manages to manipulate it to φ∗ and takes the early payment. The
16second is the case where the manager gets a high signal and takes the late payment.
The right hand side is the manager’s pay-oﬀ from shirking, in which case he takes the early
payment whenever he reaches the earnings target. Solving for the lowest t2 (φ∗,R,H) that satisﬁes












The cost of the optimal vesting contract over and above the ﬁr s tb e s tc o s td now derives from two
sources. First, optimistic managers are paid late, which is costly because of the discount parameter
λ. Second, managers earn a rent even when shirking, since they can still get the early pay if they
manage to produce earnings φ∗.
It is easy to check that the cost is increasing in m(φ∗), the ease of pessimistic managers to reach
the target. This is because the pay-oﬀ from shirking goes up when the target is easier to reach.
Therefore, the target will be set as high as possible, but cannot be set so high as to violate the
renegotiation-proofness condition (2). The optimal solution with manipulation and renegotiation
is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal renegotiation-proof contract with manipulation is given by:
a) If cost(short,h) ≤ pR − 1 the optimal contract is short-term with t1 (h) > 0 and all other
payments zero such that
E (t1|W)=pR − 1
b) If cost(short,h) >p R− 1 ≥ cost(vesting,φ∗), the contract consists of a short-term bonus
t1 (φ∗) and a vesting contract {t1 (φ∗,L),t 2 (φ∗,R,H)} with all other payments zero, where the
earning target φ∗ is set at














pR − 1 ≥ max(cost(short,h),cost(vesting,φ∗))
the project cannot be implemented.
Proof. In Appendix C.
The interesting case is b), where the vesting contract is needed to incentivize the manager.
17The contract resembles actual compensation packages. It can be implemented by a combination
of stock options and a short-term bonus t1 (φ∗). Whenever the renegotiation condition (2) binds,
the option and bonus are granted for a threshold below h, and the manager is not paid more if the
threshold is exceeded. Note that this must hold not only for the granting of options, but also for
the short-term bonus - even though a short-term contract has better incentive eﬀects if the target
is set as high as possible. This shows the value of encouraging the manager to smooth earnings - it
makes earnings less informative so that long-term compensation is credible, albeit at the expense
of short-term incentives.
By changing the target earnings, the ﬁrm can endogenously choose the level of transparency.
It is easy to show that for λ high enough, the vesting contract has lower cost than the short-term
contract with target h, so that there are ranges for which solution b) will result. We now show
that, even if the ﬁrm had the choice of introducing full transparency, it would often be better to
allow manipulation:
Proposition 3 T h e r ea l w a y se x i s t sa nR and a λ < 1 such that, for all λ ≥ λ, the project cannot be
implemented under full transparency but can be imp l e m e n t e dw i t hap o s i t i v el evel of manipulation.
Proof. In Appendix D.
The result in Proposition 3 casts some doubt on the merits of legislation such as the Sarbanes
Oxley act geared at forcefully increasing transparency or in other ways restricting contracting
opportunities in ﬁrms. If ﬁrms can inﬂuence transparency by structuring contracts in the right
way, ruling out manipulation might have the unintended consequence of eliminating beneﬁcial
long-term contracts. Our analysis suggests that it may be at least as or more important to create
institutions that make it easier for ﬁrms to commit to long-term compensation contracts even under
full transparency.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparative statics behind the choice of a long-term contract allowing
manipulation versus a short-term contract with full transparency. When the discount parameter λ
is higher than the critical value plotted in the graph, the long-term contract with manipulation is
c h e a p e rt oi m p l e m e n tt h a nas h o r t - t e r mc o n tract with full transparency. A higher λ has two eﬀects
that favor long-term contracts. First, the manager becomes less impatient, so that it is cheaper
to pay him late. Second, renegotiation becomes less valuable, so that the optimal contract can
allow for a higher level of transparency without triggering renegotiation. This in turn makes the
























Figure 2: The picture shows, for given values of θ and p, the critical level of lambda above which
it is easier to implement the long term contract with manipulation than the short term contract
with full transparency.
Increasing the potential precision θ of the short-term signal has two opposing eﬀects on the
choice of contract, producing the non-monotonic comparative static in Figure 2. First, it increases
the power of a short-term contract under full transparency. Indeed, as θ approaches 1, the short-
term contract provides as powerful incentives as a long-term full commitment contract, and since
the liquidity is higher, the short-term contract is optimal. Second, an increase in θ increases the
potential for asymmetric information between the manager and the investor, and therefore makes
it easier to commit to long-term contracts under manipulation. If θ is initially low (close to 1
2), the
second eﬀect dominates, so that increases in θ favor long-term contracts and manipulation.
4.2 Discussion: Model
4.2.1 Mixed eﬀort as a source of asymmetric information
In the paper, we concentrate on pure strategy equilibria in the choice of eﬀort by the manager, and
introduce asymmetric information through manipulation of earnings. It is also possible to have
mixed strategy equilibria where the manager mixes over his choice of eﬀort, as in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1990). In a mixed strategy equilibrium, it may also be possible to commit to long-term
contracts, as there will be asymmetric information about the eﬀort at the renegotiation stage. We
19s o l v ef o rm i x e ds t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i ai nA p p e n d i xE . The features of the contracts are similar to the
optimal contracts in Proposition 2, except that any short-term bonus will only be awarded for the
highest possible signal.
Generally, the solution with a mixed strategy equilibrium is less eﬃcient than the one with
manipulation we have studied. This is because mixing leads to suboptimally low eﬀort provision. In
contrast, with manipulation, the ﬁrst best eﬀort can be supported since the asymmetric information
is created through (costless) manipulation.
4.2.2 Repeated eﬀort
An important ingredient of the model is that renegotiation takes place after the eﬀort of the manager
is sunk. If the manager would continue to work after the renegotiation state, the temptation to
provide him with liquidity will be muted by the necessity to give him further incentives to work.
In a strict sense, our model therefore might apply best to situations where the manager is expected
to quit, retire, or switch tasks. However, even if he continues to work on the same task, some of
the eﬀort will be sunk and so there is still an ex post incentive to modify the ex ante contract in
the direction of providing more liquidity. Thus, many of the qualitative results we derive should
not be sensitive to the (extreme) assumption of a completely sunk eﬀort.
Furthermore, when renegotiation can take place before all the eﬀort is sunk, other commitment
problems appear. As pointed out by, among others, Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000), it is
often optimal ex post to provide fresh incentives to a manager even after bad initial performance.
This can destroy ex ante incentives, as the manager knows that he will be given a valuable new
compensation package even if he shirks in the ﬁrst period. Therefore, introducing asymmetric
information through manipulation might be helpful in preventing this type of renegotiation as well.
We leave for future research the interesting but probably complicated analysis of a full dynamic
eﬀort model with renegotiation.
4.2.3 Repeated manipulation
For simplicity, we have also chosen to consider manipulation only of the ﬁrst period earnings. If
a manager can report earnings dynamically, and is capable of pushing oﬀ the booking of earnings
today to a future date, or book earnings today that are expected to occur in the future, we conjecture
that contracts would look largely similar to what we have derived. In particular, a bonus schedule
with a minimum and maximum threshold would give the manager an incentive to smooth earnings
20over time, thereby reducing the informational content of the accounts. Again, a full dynamic model
is beyond the scope of this paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have set up a model of optimal executive compensation with renegotiation when managers are
more impatient than investors. We have shown that compensating the manager based on long-term
information, even when it is much more informative than short-term information, is impossible if
there is not enough opaqueness in the short-term. This is because after eﬀort is sunk, investors
always have an incentive to renegotiate any long-term contract when the manager is impatient.
Only if there is enough private information early on can a long-term contract be credible. The
private information creates a lemons problem at the renegotiation stage which can destroy the
market for renegotiation. We show that allowing the manager to manipulate short-term earnings
can be beneﬁcial. The features of the compensation contract should be set to induce the manager
to create just enough misinformation such that renegotiation is not optimal ex post. Our optimal
contracts have the following features:
• T h el o n g - t e r mp o r t i o no fc o n t r a c t sc a nb ev i e w e da sas t o c ko p t i o nt h a tt h em a n a g e rh a st h e
r i g h tt oe x e r c i s ee a r l y .H ed o e ss oi fh ef e e l st h eﬁrm is overvalued.
• The short-term portion of contracts can be viewed as a bonus that is awarded only if a
certain earning threshold is reached, with no additional payment if earnings are above the
threshold. This encourages managers to smooth earnings: Optimistic managers understate
earnings while pessimistic managers overstate them.
These results seem to conform well with observed practices in executive compensation.
Although we study manipulation as a source of asymmetric information, the logic extends to
other dimensions of transparency that the ﬁrm can inﬂuence. One example is the choice of going
public, with the extra demands on accounting and extra scrutiny from stock-markets it entails.
Another way is to design the securities that investors hold in a way that induces the right amount
of monitoring. Arms-length public debt would induce the least monitoring and thus the least
transparency, while equity held by an active investor such as a venture capitalist would induce
the most intense monitoring (see Rajan (1992) and Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) for related
models).
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AP r o o f o f L e m m a 1




{L,H}} with all other payments zero such that the manager works and it is incentive compatible
for him to truthfully reveal his type (optimistic or pessimistic) and issue his prescribed earnings:
Optimistic types issue earnings φ∗, and pessimistic types attempt to issue earnings φL.F i r s tn o t e
that without loss of generality, an optimal contract should assign pay 0 in both periods if the
earnings report is not among those prescribed for the reported type r (that is, φ/ ∈
£
l,φL¤
if r = L,
or φ/ ∈ φ∗ if r = H). If they are not, we can set them to 0 without aﬀecting the program [OPT1]
below. Therefore, the only relevant incentive compatibility constraints are those that correspond
to the following misreports:
• (φ∗,H) → (φL,L), (φ∗,H) → (l,L) : Optimistic managers misreport as pessimistic managers
who either succeeded or failed to make their earnings report. To avoid this, we require
t1(φ∗,H)+λE(t2(y,φ∗,H)|H,W) ≥ t1(φL,L)+λE(t2(y,φL,L)|H,W) (3)










attempt to misreport as optimistic managers. To avoid this, we require






→ (l,L): Pessimistic managers attempt to issue earnings l
instead of φL. To avoid this, we require
t1(φL,L)+λE(t2(y,φL,L)|L,W) ≥ t1(l,L)+λE(t2(y,l,L)|L,W) (6)
22First, note that (5) and limited liability imply (6), and therefore we drop this constraint.
Further, since the payments when the managers’ earnings report is not prescribed for his reported
type are 0, there is a redundancy in his reporting his type (his earnings report reveals it whenever
φ∗ 6∈ {l,φL}). Hence we drop the reported type from consideration from now on. The optimization
program to solve then becomes:
max
φL,φ∗∈[l,h],{t1(φ),t2(y,φ)}y∈{0,R},φ∈[l,φL,φ∗]
E (t1(φ)|W)+λE (t2(y,φ)|W) ([OPT1])
subject to the moral hazard constraint:








{m(φ)(t1(φ)+λt2(0,φ)) + (1 − m(φ))(t1(l)+λt2(0,l))}
¾
,
the IC constraints (3-5),
the break even constraint:
E (t1(φ)|W)+E (t2(y,φ)|W) ≤ pR − 1,
and limited liability:
t1(φ),t 2(y,φ) ≥ 0 ∀φ.
The right hand side of the moral hazard constraint can be understood as follows. If the manager
deviates and shirks, he will not necessarily stick to the equilibrium prescribed manipulation. Given
the payment schedule and his expectation about proﬁts, he will ﬁrst choose the best possible
earnings manipulation strategy available to him. When the manager shirks, second period proﬁts
are bound to be zero.
We proceed to relax the IC constraints, and show that the solution to this relaxed program
meets the IC constraints (3-5). We now establish the Lemma via a series of Claims. First, note
that any contract that can be perturbed so that E (t1(φ)|W) and E (t2(y,φ)|W) are kept constant
but the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint goes down weakly, can be disregarded as an
optimal solution:
Claim 2 Suppose a contract t ≡ {t1(φ),t 2(y,φ)}y∈{0,R},φ∈[l,φL,φ∗] can be changed for a contract
23t0 ≡ {t0
1(φ),t 0













and such that the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint goes down. Then, there is no loss
of generality from ruling out the contract t as a solution to the program.
Proof. Any such change keeps the maximand, the break even constraint, and the left hand
side of the moral hazard constraint unchanged. Since the right hand side of the moral hazard
constraint goes down, the new contract is feasible if the old contract is and gives the same payoﬀ
to the manager. Thus, the new contract is no worse than the original contract, and there is no loss
from ruling out t as a solution.
We use the claim above to prove the results below. We ﬁrst show that the optimal contract
never pays for low proﬁts, since this decreases incentives to work:
Claim 3 In an optimal contract, t2(0,φ)=0and t2(R,φ) ≡ t2(R) for all φ.
Proof. Suppose t2(0,φ) > 0 for some φ. Then, construct t0 by reducing t2(0,φ) and increasing





This reduces the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint.
Suppose t2(R,φ) 6= t2(R,φ0) for some φ and φ0. Then, introduce a new contract t0 equivalent







2(y,φ)|W)=E (t2(y,φ)|W) and the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint is
unchanged.
Using this result, the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint can be written as:
P (H|S)m a x
φ∈{l,φL,φ∗}
t1(φ)+P (L|S)m a x
φ∈{l,φL,φ∗}
{m(φ)(t1(φ)) + (1 − m(φ))t1(l)} (7)
24We now show that it is optimal to induce optimistic managers to issue the highest possible
earnings h, since this makes it harder for pessimistic managers to mimic.
Claim 4 In an optimal contract, φ∗ = h.
Proof. Setting φ∗ = h without changing φL does not change E (t1(φ)|W) or the ﬁrst term in
(7). Suppose t1(φ∗) ≤ t1(l). Then, setting φ∗ = h does not change the second term in (7). Now
suppose t1(φ∗) >t 1(l). Then, setting φ∗ = h (weakly) reduces the second term in (7) since
m(φ∗)t1(φ∗)+( 1− m(φ∗))t1(l)
is increasing in m(φ) when t1(φ∗) >t 1(l), and m(φ) is decreasing in φ. Thus, we should set φ∗ = h.
Using the above result, we proceed with φ∗ = h in the proofs below.
Claim 5 In an optimal contract, t1(h) ≥ t1(φL) ≥ t1(l)
Proof. Suppose t1(h) <t 1(φL). Then, (7) does not change if t1(h) is increased. If we increase
t1(h) and decrease t1(φL) to keep E (t1(φ,σ)|W) constant, (7) falls. Thus, t1(h) ≥ t1(φL) in an
optimal contract. Now suppose t1(φL) <t 1(l). Then, (7) does not change if t1(φL) is increased. If
we reduce t1(l) and increase t1(φL) to keep E (t1(φ,σ)|W) constant, (7) falls. So t1(φL) ≥ t1(l) in
an optimal contract.
We now show that without loss of generality, we can set φL = h so that pessimistic managers
try to mimic optimistic managers in their manipulation of earnings.
Claim 6 Without loss of generality, in an optimal contract, φL = h.
Proof. Suppose φL <h .Using Claim 5, the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint
now becomes
P (H|S)t1(h) (8)

















Using this, we now show that when φL <h ,an optimal contract should make a pessimistic manager
indiﬀerent between attempting to issue earnings φL and h. Suppose to the contrary that









25Note that this implies that t1(h) >t 1(φL), since m(h) <m
¡
φL¢
when φL <h .Then, we can
decrease t1(h) and increase t1(φL) to keep E (t1(φ)|W) constant. This reduces (7).
Now suppose

































This changes (7) by a factor of
P (L|W)
P (H|W)
P (H|S) − P (L|S) < 0










whenever φL <h .But then, suppose we set φL = h. This does not change the program and so can
be done without loss of generality. Thus, we can set φL = h without loss of generality.
Using the result above, (7) becomes
(P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(h))t1(h)+( 1− m(h))t1(l). (9)
Claim 7 In an optimal contract, t1(l)=0 .
Proof. Suppose t1(l) > 0. Then, reduce t1(l) and increase t1(h) to keep E (t1(φ)|W) constant:
(P (H|W)+m(h)P (L|W))dt1(h)=−(1 − m(h))P (L|W)dt1(l)
This changes (9) by a factor of
P (H|S)+m(h)P (L|S)
P (H|W)+m(h)P (L|W)
(1 − m(h))P (L|W) − (1 − m(h))P (L|S)
< (1 − m(h))P (L|W) − (1 − m(h))P (L|S)
< 0
26To conclude, the proposed optimal solution to [OPT1] is φL = φ∗ = h, t1(h,·) constant, t2(R,·,·)
constant, and all other payments equal 0.I t i s e a s i l y v e r i ﬁed that this solution to the relaxed
program meets the IC constraints (3-5) and therefore solves [OPT1]. Finally, recall that we had
assumed that φ∗ 6∈ {l,φL} in order to ignore the reported type. However, we now have that
φ∗ = φL = h. We hence need to show that we cannot improve on this solution by taking into
account the reported type. Note that (3) and (5) are met at equality in our proposed solution, as
is the break-even inequality. To improve on this solution, at least one of optimistic and pessimistic
manager’s payoﬀ will have to increase strictly, and neither can decrease (since the ICs are met at
equality). Since the break-even constraint is met ate q u a l i t y ,t h i sc a no n l yb ed o n eb yt r a n s f e r r i n g
period 2 payoﬀst op e r i o d1. However note that by the lead-up to Proposition 1, we have that
either we implement a purely short-term contract (in which case such a transfer is impossible),
or else the moral hazard constraint binds - in which case such a transfer would violate the moral
hazard constraint.
B Proof of Claim 1
Recall the contract t = {t1(φ∗,r),t 2(y,φ∗,r)}y∈{0,R},r∈{L,H} is renegotiation proof for high eﬀort if






















































≥ t1(φ,L)+λ(P (R|L,W)t2(R,φ,L)+P (0|L,W)t2(0,φ,L)) (IRL)
27t0
1(φ,r),t 0
2(y,φ,r) ≥ 0 ∀r,y (LL)
We will prove a more general result than Claim 1 here. First, we show that for an earnings
announcement φ that reveals the manager’s type σ, a renegotiation-proof contract must be short-
term:
Lemma 2 If P (φ|σ,W)=0for some σ, an optimal renegotiation-proof contract is short-term
conditional on earnings realization φ with t1(φ,L)=t1(φ,H).
Proof. The only payoﬀ relevant part of the contract when P (φ|σ,W)=0are payments
contingent on σ0 6= σ where P (φ|σ0,W) > 0. Suppose contrary to the claim in the Lemma that





















and all other payments contingent on σ to zero. Then, no conditions are violated, but the minimand
is reduced so a renegotiation proof contract must have t2 (y,φ,σ0)=0for all y. It is easy to see that
in the ex ante problem, if the equilibrium prescribes P (φ|σ,W)=0 , it is without loss of generality
to make the expected payoﬀ f o ram a n a g e rw i t hs i g n a lσ as low as possible when he issues the oﬀ
equilibrium earnings φ. Thus, we should set t1(φ,σ)=t1(φ,σ0) ≡ t1(φ).
Since P (φ|H,W)=0for φ 6= φ∗, second period payments are only possible contingent on
φ = φ∗. We now characterize renegotiation proof long-term contracts. We restrict attention to
contracts that can have t2(R,φ∗,σ) > 0 for some σ. It is easy to show that a long-term contract
28that pays only for low proﬁts can never be optimal.
Lemma 3 Conditional on earnings realization φ∗, the contract t(φ∗) is renegotiation proof if and














B.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Claim 8 In a renegotiation-proof contract, it is optimal to set t2(R,φ∗,L)=0 .
Proof. Suppose t2(R,φ∗,L) > 0. Then, lower t2(R,φ∗,L) and increase t1(φ∗,L) to keep the left
hand side of ICL and IRL constant. This lowers the RHS of ICH as P(R|H,W) >P(R|L,W),
and leaves all other constraints unchanged. This decreases the minimand as λ<1, a contradiction.
Claim 9 In a renegotiation-proof contract, it is optimal to set t2(0,φ ∗,H)=0 .
Proof. Otherwise, lower t2(0,φ ∗,H) and increase t1(φ∗,H) to keep the left hand side of ICH
and IRH constant. This relaxes ICL as 1 − P(R|H,W) < 1 − P(R|L,W).A sP(H|φ∗,W) > 0,
this strictly decreases the minimand as λ<1, a contradiction.
Claim 10 Suppose {t} is renegotiation proof such that t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0.T h e n , t2(0,φ ∗,L)=0
and t1(φ∗,L)=t1(φ∗,H)+λP (R|L)t2(R,φ∗,H)
Proof. First, we show that if t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0, ICL must bind. Suppose to the contrary that
ICL is slack and t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0. Then, lower t2(R,φ∗,H) and increase t1(φ∗,H) to keep the left
hand side of ICH and IRH constant. This decreases the minimand since λ<1, and does not
29violate ICL since it is slack. Thus, ICL must bind. But then, ICH must be slack, since
t1(φ∗,H)+λP (R|H,W)t2(R,φ∗,H)
>t 1(φ∗,H)+λP (R|L,W)t2(R,φ∗,H)
= t1(φ∗,L)+λP (0|L,W)t2(0,φ ∗,L)
≥ t1(φ∗,L)+λP (0|H,W)t2(0,φ ∗,L)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from P(R|H,W) >P (R|L,W) and the last from P (0|L,W) >
P (0|H,W). Therefore, ICH can be omitted from the program. Now we show that t2(0,φ ∗,L)=
0. Otherwise, lower t2(0,φ ∗,L) and increase t1(φ∗,L) to keep the left hand side of ICL con-
stant. This weakly decreases the minimand and violates no constraints (ICH already having been
shown redundant). From the binding ICL constraint, we therefore have t0
1(φ∗,L)=t1(φ∗,H)+
λP (R|L)t2(R,φ∗,H)
The above results establish that either the contract is short-term, in which case t1(φ∗,L)=
t1(φ∗,H) from ICLand ICH,or t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0 with t1(φ∗,L)=t1(φ∗,H)+λP (R|L)t2(R,φ∗,H)
and all other payments are zero. We now establish the last part of the Lemma.
Claim 11 If the manager works at time 0, t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0 is renegotiation proof if and only if
Condition (10) does not hold.
Proof. Suppose t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0. Then, any perturbation that increases t2(R,φ∗,H) and
reduces t1(φ∗,H) while satisfying ICL, IRL and IRH, cannot increase the lender’s payoﬀ as
λ<1. Hence, the only possible gain is if t2(R,φ∗,H) is lowered and t1(φ∗,H) is increased. Such
a perturbation that keeps the right-hand-side of ICL constant lowers the left-hand-side of IRH
and hence cannot be feasible. Therefore, lower t2(R,φ∗,H) and increase t1(φ∗,H) to keep the
left-hand-side of IRH constant. The change in the objective function is
P (H|φ∗,W)(λP(R|H,W) − P(R|H,W)) + P (L|φ∗,W)λ(P(R|H,W) − P(R|L,W))































This is negative if and only if Condition (10) holds, in which case the minimand is decreased and
t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0 cannot be renegotiation-proof. Thus, t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0 is renegotiation proof if and
only if Condition (10) is violated.
This concludes the proof of the Lemma. Now, suppose φL = φ∗, so that P (φ∗|L,W)=m(φ∗).
Then, the Lemma coincides with Claim 1.
C Proof of Proposition 2
First, note that if a short-term contract can make the manager work while allowing the investor to
break even, it is ﬁrst best. Since short-term contracts are renegotiation proof, the optimal short-
term contract coincides with the full commitment case t1 (h) > 0 and all other payments zero, and
is feasible if
cost(short,h) ≤ pR − 1,
which is the ﬁrst part of the Proposition.
If the short-term contract is not feasible, the only other candidate is a long-term contract with
t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0. From Lemma 3, the short-term payments at φ∗ are given by t1(φ∗,H) ≥ 0 and
t1(φ∗,L)=t1(φ∗,H)+λP(R|L,W)t2(R,φ∗,H)
For φ 6= φ∗, Lemma 2 shows that the contract must be short-term. With slight abuse of notation,
we denote the short-term payment at φL given to pessimistic managers by t1(φL,L), where it
is understood that for φL 6= φ∗, there is also an oﬀ-equilibrium pay-oﬀ t1(φL,H)=t1(φL,L).
Similarly, we denote the short-term payment given to pessimistic managers at l by t1(l,L), where
it is understood that for l 6= φ∗, there is also an oﬀ-equilibrium pay-oﬀ t1(l,H)=t1(l,L). When
φL = φ∗ or l = φ∗, these payments are replaced by {t1(φ∗,L),t 1(φ∗,H)}.
Using the results from Appendix B, the ex ante program becomes
max
φ∗,φL,t1(φ∗,H),t2(R,φ∗,H),t1(φL,L),t1(l,L)
E (t1(φ,σ)|W)) + λP(R,H|W)t2(R,φ∗,H)
31subject to the moral hazard constraint:






the break even constraint:
























t1(l,L) ≥ m(φ∗)t1(φ∗,L)+( 1− m(φ∗))t1(l,L)
t1(φL,L) ≥ t1(l,L)
and limited liability:
t1(φ,σ),t 2(y,φ,σ) ≥ 0 ∀y,φ,σ.
To understand the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint, recall that output is always
low when the manager shirks. Hence, the manager certainly prefers to always announce she has
a low signal and get paid in period 1. The renegotiation constraints follow from Lemma 3 when
t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0. The incentive compatibility constraints ensures that a manager sticks to the
equilibrium manipulation and report.
We now show that in an optimal contract, pessimistic managers try to mimic optimistic man-
agers in their earnings report:
Claim 12 φL = φ∗.
Proof. A necessary condition for the renegotiation condition to hold if t2(R,φ∗,H) > 0 is that
32either φL = φ∗ or φL >φ ∗ = l so that P (φ∗|L,W) > 0. Thus, suppose contrary to the Claim that













Suppose we set φL0 = φ∗ = l and t0
1(l,L)=t1(l,L)+∆,t 0






















This does not aﬀect the maximand, the break even constraint, or the left hand side of the moral
hazard constraints. This (weakly) relaxes renegotiation and incentive compatibility conditions. The
right hand side of the moral hazard constraint now becomes t0

































t1(l,L) − t1(φL,L) ≤ 0
from the incentive compatibility constraints, and
¡








> 1 − P (L|S)
> 0
Hence, the right hand side of the moral hazard constraint goes down (strictly). Using a similar
argument to Claim 2, this solution is not optimal and we have the requisite contradiction.
Claim 13 We can set t1(l,L)=0if φ∗ >l .




33where ∆ is set so that E (t0
1(φ,σ)|W)=E (t1(φ,σ)|W) constant:
(P (H|W)+P (L|W)m(φ∗))∆ = P (L|W)(1− m(φ∗))t1(l,L)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dφ∗ = φL.T h i s d o e s n o t a ﬀect the maximand, the break even constraint,
the left hand side of the moral hazard constraint, or the renegotiation constraints. The incentive
compatibility conditions are relaxed. The right hand side of the moral hazard constraint changes
by
(P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗))∆ − P (L|S)(1− m(φ∗))t1(l,L)




P (L|W) − P (L|S)
¶
< 0,
and hence once again we have the requisite contradiction.
Using the above claim, we can drop t1(l,L) from the program above. With these results, the
program pays only for earnings φ∗, and pessimistic managers try to mimic optimistic managers.
Together with the renegotiation constraints, this implies that the incentive compatibility conditions
can be dropped from the program as they are always satisﬁed. Next, we show that φ∗ should be
s e ta sh i g ha sp o s s i b l e ,s u b j e c tt on o tv i olating the renegotiation constraints:















Proof. Suppose φ∗ <φ ∗∗ in a candidate optimal contract. Then, introduce a new contract with




where ∆ is set so that E (t0
1(φ,σ)|W)=E (t1(φ,σ)|W):
∆ =
P (L|W)(m(φ∗) − m(φ∗∗))t1(φ∗,L)
P (H|W)+P (L|W)m(φ∗∗)
This does not change the maximand, the break even constraint, or the left-hand side of the moral
hazard constraint and does not violate the renegotiation constraints. The right hand side of the
34moral hazard constraint changes by
(P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗∗))(t1(φ∗,L)+∆)
−(P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗))t1(φ∗,L)








Hence, the program is relaxed.
Note that the program is only feasible if φ∗∗ exists. Using the results above, and substituting






subject to the moral hazard constraint:
(P (H|W)+P (L|W)m(φ∗∗))t1(φ∗∗,H)
+λ(P(R,H|W)+P(R,L|W)m(φ∗∗))t2(R,φ∗∗,H) − d
≥ (P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗∗))(t1(φ∗∗,H)+λP(R|L,W)t2(R,φ∗∗,H))
the break even constraint:
(P (H|W)+P (L|W)m(φ∗∗))t1(φ∗∗,H)
+(P(R,H|W)+λP(R,L|W)m(φ∗∗))t2(R,φ∗∗,H)
≤ pR − 1
and limited liability:
t1(φ∗∗,H),t 2(R,φ∗∗,H) ≥ 0 ∀y,φ,σ
Note that since we have assumed that an optimal short-term contract is not feasible, the program
is not feasible for t2(R,φ∗∗,H)=0 . Now we check the condition for a contract with t2(R,φ∗∗,H) >
0,t 1(φ∗∗,H)=0to be feasible. If there is no such contract, there is no contract at all for which
35the program is feasible.





(λ(P(R,H|W)+P(R,L|W)m(φ∗∗)) − (P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗∗))λP(R|L,W))
Substituting into the left hand side of the break even constraint, we get
(P(R,H|W)+λP(R,L|W)m(φ∗∗))d
(λ(P(R,H|W)+P(R,L|W)m(φ∗∗)) − (P (H|S)+P (L|S)m(φ∗∗))λP(R|L,W))
≤ pR − 1
or
cost(vesting,φ∗∗) ≤ pR − 1
Thus, when
cost(vesting,φ∗∗) ≤ pR − 1 < cost(short,h)
, the optimal contract is found by a mix of the short-term component t1(φ∗∗,H) and the long-term
component t2(R,φ∗∗,H) such that the break-even and moral hazard conditions are satisﬁed with
equality. This is case b) of the Proposition. When
min(cost(vesting,φ∗∗),cost(short,h)) >p R− 1
the program is not feasible. This is case c) of the Proposition.
D Proof of Proposition 3
We have to show that there exists a λ, R, and a function φ∗ (λ) with m(φ∗ (λ)) > 0 such that, for
all λ ≥λ












36If that is the case, there must be an R such that
cost(vesting,φ∗ (λ)) <p R− 1 < cost(short,H)

















































Note that m(φ∗ (λ)) is continuous in λ for λ ∈ (0,1] and cost(vesting,m(φ∗ (λ))) is continuous in
m(φ∗ (λ)), so that cost(vesting,φ∗ (λ)) is continuous in λ for λ ∈ (0,1]. Therefore, if we show that
for λ =1 , (where m(φ∗ (λ)) = 0 ) cost(vesting,φ∗ (λ)) < cost(short,H),t h e r em u s tb es o m eλ < 1













θ(1 − p)+( 1− θ)p
<
1 − θ
θp+( 1− θ)(1− p)
the result follows. Simplifying, the inequality above becomes
(1 − θ)
2 <θ 2
which is always true since θ>1
2.
37E Mixed strategy equilibrium
N o ww el o o ka tam i x e ds t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u m .W eg i v e an intuitive exposition here, the full proofs
are available on request.
Suppose there is no manipulation of earnings, but the manager works with probability α and
shirks with probability 1 − α. This potentially introduces a way to pay in period 2, since in the
renegotiation, the agent with a low eﬀort will want to consume early. We ﬁr s ta s s u m et h ec o n t r a c t
is given by {t1 (H),t 2 (R,H)} with all other payments zero. Note that a manager that shirks will
never get t2 since P (R|S)=0 .
E.1 Renegotiation stage
We ﬁrst derive the conditions for a payment t2 (R,H) > 0 to be renegotiation proof. After the
signal σ has been observed, the investor can oﬀer a new contract {t0
1 (σ),t 0
2 (y,σ)}. Note that if
σ = L, there are no payments to the agent under the original contract, so there is no way to improve
by oﬀering a new contract. Now suppose σ = H. Suppose the investor oﬀers a new contract that
pays managers oﬀ early: t0 = {t0
1 (H) >t 1 (H),t 0
2 (R,H)=0 }. For a manager who has worked to
accept this new contract, we have to have
t0
1 (H) ≥ t1 (H)+λP(R|H,W)t2 (R,H)
Suppose the investor sets t0
1 (H) such that a working manager just accepts the oﬀer. The gain to
the investor from renegotiating with working managers is then given by
(1 − λ)P(R|H,W)t2 (R,H)
However, shirking managers will now get a higher payment t0
1 (H). The loss to the investor on
shirking managers is therefore
λP(R|H,W)t2 (R,H)
38Hence, the original contract is renegotiation proof if







where P(W|H) denotes the probability the investor attaches to the manager having worked after













E.2 Ex Ante Stage
We now solve the ex ante problem, using the renegotiation condition (11). The problem is
max
α,t1(H),t2(R,H)
α(P(H|W)(t1 (H)+λP (R|H,W)t2 (R,H)) − d)
+(1− α)P(H|S)t1 (H)
such that the agent is indiﬀerent between working and shirking:
P(H|W)(t1 (H)+λP (R|H,W)t2 (R,H)) − d
= P(H|S)t1 (H)
, the investor breaks even:
α(P(H|W)t1 (H)+P (R|H,W)t2 (R,H)) + (1 − α)P(H|S)t1 (H)
≤ pR − 1








First, note that the ﬁrst best is achieved if a pure short-term contract with full transparency is





≤ pR − 1
Then, we can set α =1and t2 =0 . Now, suppose the pure short-term contract is not feasible.








The solution is feasible if the cost of inducing work with a pure long-term contract still allows the













≤ αpR − 1
where αpR −1 is the expected gain to the investor gross of transfers to the manager. We can now
characterize the solution as follows:
Proposition 4 a) If cost(short,H) ≤ pR − 1 the optimal contract is short-term with t1 (H) > 0
and all other payments zero such that
E (t1|W)=pR − 1
The managers works with probability 1.
40b) If cost(short,H) >p R− 1 and αd








, the contract consists of a short-term bonus t1 (H) and a long-term payment t2 (R,H),a n dt h e
manager works with probability α.
c) If cost(short,H) >p R− 1 and αd
λ >α p R− 1, the project cannot be implemented.
Proof. Follows easily from the analysis above.
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